


**Secret**

*NOFORN*



*HR*

## STAFF NOTES:

**Middle East  
Africa  
South Asia**

**Secret**

No. 0822/75  
November 19, 1975

*246*

*NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON*

**Warning Notice  
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  
(WNINTEL)**

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

**DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS**

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY-	USIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . . -	This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .

Classified by 010725  
Exempt from general declassification schedule  
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:  
S 5B(1), (2), and (3)  
Automatically declassified on:  
Date Impossible to Determine

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200070001-1

## MIDDLE EAST – AFRICA – SOUTH ASIA

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

### CONTENTS

United Arab Emirates: State of the Federation . . . . .	1
Pakistan: New Measures Against the Opposition . . . . .	3

Nov 19, 1975

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200070001-1

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200070001-1

United Arab Emirates

*State of the Federation*

The rulers of the seven member states of the United Arab Emirates met this week and agreed to place police, internal security, and intelligence functions under federal control. Nearly four years after the creation of the union, however, agreement on merger of their defense forces continues to elude the emirs. Much of the credit for these latest steps toward strengthening the federation, if they stick, should be given to Saudi Arabia's Prince Fahd who threw his weight behind the efforts of UAE President Sheik Zayid during Fahd's visit to the emirates last week.

Sheikh Zayid, ruler of the wealthiest emirate Abu Dhabi and driving force behind the federation, is disappointed that full integration of the defense establishments was not achieved in spite of Fahd's intensive lobbying effort with the emirs. Some of the rulers fear that the 13,000-man Abu Dhabi Defense Force and the 3,000-man UAE Defense Force under Zayid's control would dominate the much smaller contingents of the other sheikhdoms in a fully integrated federal force.

Zayid's ambition to move ahead rapidly with centralization of the emirates' government and financial institutions continues to be stymied by Vice President Rashid, ruler of the second most important emirate Dubai, who favors a more deliberate pace.

25X6

Earlier this month, the rulers of Sharjah and Fujairah, probably swayed by financial inducements from Zayid, issued decrees calling for the merger of their local government departments with counterpart

(Continued)

Nov 19, 1975

1

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200070001-1

federal ministries. Although Rashid is probably chafing under the pressure being applied both by Prince Fahd and his fellow emirs, it is unlikely, in view of his own firm convictions and Dubai's independent financial position, that he will move more rapidly on federation.

Even so, Rashid's apparent concession on integration of police and intelligence functions is significant both in terms of strengthening the UAE's internal security and in creating a more favorable atmosphere for further steps toward federation.

The rulers' earlier decisions to strengthen the federation have not always been strictly observed, however. Dubai, for example, has ignored a federal regulation that enjoins a member state to consult with the UAE oil ministry before negotiating a contract with a foreign company. It remains to be seen whether the decision this week to integrate police and security services will be implemented or whether it is no more than a paper formulation devised to save President Zayid's face. A clearer picture may emerge as to where the federation is heading when the rulers meet again in late December.

(SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)

25X1A



~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200070001-1

Pakistan

*New Measures Against the Opposition*

Prime Minister Bhutto reportedly is taking a number of new steps to counter his political opponents, who have grown more active in recent months.

Last week Bhutto took advantage of his party's strong majority in the national legislature to secure passage of some constitutional amendments whose main purpose, [redacted]

[redacted] is to deny the right of judicial review to persons detained for political reasons. [redacted]

[redacted] Bhutto is giving expanded authority and manpower to the government's civilian and military intelligence services for monitoring opposition political activities. The government, which has incarcerated a number of anti-Bhutto political leaders over the past several years, arrested two more opposition legislators last week.

The new measures appear to be primarily a result of opposition activities in Punjab province, where three-fifths of Pakistan's people live. G.M. Khar, a former aide to Bhutto and ex-governor of the province, has been mounting an anti-Bhutto campaign there in recent months and appears to be having some success in winning support from other opposition politicians. Opposition activity has also started to pick up a bit in Sind--Bhutto's birthplace and the country's second most populous province--and in the frontier province of Baluchistan.

Bhutto has enjoyed wide support in both Punjab and Sind during most of his four years in power, but economic problems such as inflation, along with long-standing ethnic and regional rivalries, may have begun to cut into his popularity. The Prime Minister has never been particularly popular in Baluchistan or in the North-West Frontier, Pakistan's other province.

(Continued)

Nov 19, 1975

3

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : ~~SECRET~~ CIA-RDP79T00865A002200070001-1

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200070001-1

Bhutto's latest measures, [REDACTED] might be part of a broader plan in which the government would seek to intimidate the opposition into silence or disarray, and, if successful, would then call a national election to be held sometime in the first half of 1976, a year ahead of the constitutional deadline. Last week Bhutto, possibly with an early election in mind, announced a major agricultural tax reform that should give a new boost to his popularity among the country's numerous small land-holders, most of whom live in Punjab province. Regardless of when an election is held, Bhutto and his government are unlikely to rely solely on their popularity; the Prime Minister's readiness to resort to intimidation and fraud has been amply reflected in various by-elections conducted in recent years. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)

25X1C

25X1A

[REDACTED]

Nov 19, 1975

4

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200070001-1

**Secret**

**Secret**